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ABSTRACT
Human capital theory has traditionally been used as the primary explanation for objective
career success. However, inconsistent results of the human capital-performance evaluationobjective career success relationships, as proposed in human capital theory, motivated this
dissertation to further develop the theory by including economic, managerial, and institutional
facets. These facets include not only an economic rational perspective, but also a managerial
component that considers organizational policies and practices, as well as an institutional
component that considers how environmental pressures influence objective career success. Also,
boundary conditions for the proposed model are hypothesized explaining how the relationships
between the constructs differ for managers and non-managers. The hypothesized relationships
are tested in a Latin American context using rich proprietary data.
The results of the study lend support for the managerial and institutional facets of the
theory of human capital of career success. On the other hand, the economic facet was not
supported due to the non-significant relationships between the human capital components and
performance evaluation scores. Also, support was found for the boundary condition, rank, on
performance evaluations. This finding suggests that performance evaluations are a more
important consideration for the objective career success of non-managers than for managers in
environments with strong socio-cultural and institutional pressures such as those found in Latin
America.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines the factors that may influence individual career success in the
context of socio-cultural and institutional pressures. Particular theoretical and empirical
emphases are placed on the potential influences of individual human capital components (i.e.,
education, experience, and training), and on performance evaluations. The theoretical frame used
for the examination is human capital theory in the form that includes its economic, managerial,
and institutional facets. Based on this theoretical frame, a formal model is proposed depicting
performance evaluation as a partial mediator of the relationships between human capital
components and objective career success operationalized as pay. This model is empirically tested
in the context of a major Ecuadorian financial services company using a cross-sectional design
with subsequent path analyses.
This dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter One focuses on the formulation of
propositions grounded in the economic, managerial, and institutional facets of the human capital
theory of career success. Based on these propositions, a formal model is developed and specific
contributions of this theory-based model are outlined. In Chapter Two, the descriptions of
specific constructs which are components of the proposed theoretical model, are provided along
with the development of hypothesized relationships among these variables. In Chapter Three, the
theoretical model is tested using a cross sectional design and structural equation modeling, and
the results obtained from the analysis are presented. Chapter Four offers an interpretation of the
1

empirical results, and Chapter Five offers theoretical and practical implications of the findings as
well as directions for future research.
This research contributes to the career success literature in several ways. The first
contribution is the extension of the theory of human capital of career success to include not only
the rational, economic facet but also a managerial facet in terms of managerial influence on
organizational policies and practices, and an institutional facet that considers managerial
responses to contextual pressures. This extension of theory addresses how these three facets
provide complementary explanations for the relationships between human capital constructs and
career success outcomes. This contribution is significant because existing explanations of how
career success is influenced by human capital do not combine economic, managerial, and
institutional facets of human capital theory.
The second contribution of this study is a rare use of secondary data from a Latin
American country. This contribution is unique because career success research in a Latin
American context is virtually non-existent. The socio-cultural and institutional contexts of Latin
American countries differ from the contexts of other countries in that Latin American countries
share a “common Roman law heritage, a common Iberian colonial past, and present day patterns
of social organization” (Rosenn, 1988, p. 128). Furthermore, individuals living in Latin
American countries share a strong sense of dignity, in-group collectivism, and paternalistic
behaviors (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). These unique contextual factors
may affect performance evaluations and career success in organizations located in Latin
American countries.
The third contribution of this dissertation is the appropriateness of the data used for
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theory testing in this dissertation. The detailed proprietary data on training and performance
evaluation, which was obtained from a large financial services firm, makes this research different
from previous studies of this type that mostly relied on large national survey databases of selfreported data collected in other continents (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).
Self-report measures, used in these studies, have the drawback of relying on individuals‟
accuracy of remembering their training and performance (Barron, Berger, & Black, 1994). Also,
a major assumption of these studies is that individuals were willing to provide accurate
information (Bing, Stewart, Davison, Green, McIntyre, & James, 2007). Even when studies
incorporate secondary data that are structured into databases, there is a major concern that
samples taken from these databases might suffer from inconsistency of measures used across
organizations. This inconsistency is in particular likely to apply to measures of performance
evaluations and training collected across firms that use different procedures for performance
evaluations. In contrast, objective (i.e., non-self-report) data collected from a single firm, as is
the case in this dissertation, offers two specific benefits for career success research which are: 1)
a reduction in ambiguity regarding the accuracy of the reported information, and 2) consistency
in the procedures/ metrics used within a single organization as records of objective career
success are typically kept in human resource departments and are commonly standardized across
units within the organization (Heslin, 2005). These benefits are important because very few
studies have analyzed the associations of human capital constructs in relation to pay outcome
using a proprietary data set from a firm (Bartel, 1995; Krueger & Rouse, 1998). Furthermore,
none of these studies was conducted in the context of a developing or emerging country, as is the
case of this dissertation.
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The fourth contribution is the examination of the boundary condition for the proposed
extended human capital theory of career success. In particular, the theoretically relevant variable,
rank (i.e., managers and non-managers), is examined in terms of its potential to engender a
boundary condition for the proposed extension of the theory of human capital of career success.
This contribution is important as it specifies the conditions under which the theory applies and
therefore adding to the predictive accuracy of the theory (Gray & Cooper, 2010).
Overall, the research presented in this dissertation fills the need for more comprehensive
theorizing and empirical testing of the relationships among human capital, performance
evaluation, and career success. Specifically, the aim is to theoretically explain and empirically
test the mechanisms by which human capital contributes to objective career success in terms of
pay is accomplished in this dissertation by (a) the extension of the human capital theory of career
success across its key facets, and through (b) its testing in a specific South American institutional
context (i.e., Ecuador) using unique data (i.e., proprietary non-self-report data).
Theoretical Development and Formulation of Research Propositions
The twenty-first century has brought about significant environmental changes driven by
radical technological innovation, globalization, and hypercompetition (Cascio & Aguinis, 2008).
These changes have forced organizations to shift away from bureaucratic and vertical,
hierarchical organizational structures to more organic and horizontal, flatter structures (GomezMejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010). This structural flattening has required employees to
accumulate human capital in order for them to be highly employable (Pulakos, Arad, Donovan,
& Plamondon, 2000) in organizations that strive to stay nimble and competitive (Cascio &
Aguinis, 2008). The flattening has therefore transformed the way scholars and practitioners
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understand the traditional concept of career success (Heslin, 2005), as the processes of
organizational delayering, downsizing, and outsourcing have limited the desirable options of
achieving career success through hierarchical progression of promotion (Evans, Gunz, & Jalland,
1997; Hall, 2002; Reitman & Schneer, 2003). Therefore, as the organizational structure and
processes have been changing, so has the role of human capital become salient in achieving
career success. To capture and study that salience, the influence of human capital on career
success is examined in this dissertation using the lens of three facets of human capital theory:
economic, managerial, and institutional.

Human Capital Theory of Career Success: Economic Facet
Career success has been defined as work related outcomes gained over a lifetime of work
experiences (London & Stumpf, 1982; Judge & Bretz, 1994; Seibert, Crant, & Kraimer, 1999;
Sullivan & Baruch, 2009). Achieving career success is important from both individual and
organizational standpoints (Feldman, 1989; 2002). From an individual standpoint, achieving
career success may lead to the improvement in social status, job satisfaction, health, and an
overall positive emotional state (Becker, 1993; Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). From an
organizational standpoint, career success is associated with organizationally significant outcomes
such as higher productivity, citizenship behaviors, lower turnover, and ultimately a higher return
on investment per employee (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).
Career success is objective when it reflects observable achievements of an individual,
such as pay and/or promotion (Arthur, Khapova & Wilderom, 2005; Judge & Bretz, 1994; Judge,
Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). Objective career success is different from subjective career
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success, which reflects self-perceived individual accomplishments during one‟s career (Hall &
Mirvis, 1996; Heslin, 2005; Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005; Abele & Wiese, 2008). This
distinction is important because empirical evidence suggest that factors influencing subjective
career success are commonly different from those that lead to objective career success (Arnold &
Cohen, 2008). Specifically, human capital and socio-demographic antecedents have a stronger
relationship with objective career success while organizational sponsorship (i.e., supervisor
support, organizational resources) and stable individual traits (i.e., neuroticism,
conscientiousness) are stronger predictors of subjective career success (Ng, Eby, Sorensen, &
Feldman, 2005).
Empirical evidence suggests that human capital is one of the main drivers of objective
career success (see Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005). In particular, labor economists have
used human capital theory as one of the most powerful explanations as to why pay increases over
time (Williams, 2009). Human capital theory suggests that a diverse set of economic benefits can
be accrued from the accumulation of individual knowledge, skills, and abilities (Becker, 1964).
The roots of human capital theory originate from Adam Smith (1776) who suggested that
investments in acquiring abilities is the primary means of generating revenues (Zula &
Chermack, 2007). The concept of the investment in human capital was later theoretically
developed and empirically tested in the studies conducted by leading economic scholars (Zula &
Chermack, 2007). These scholars argued that the production model should include human capital
in addition to physical capital, labor, land, and entrepreneurship (Nafukho, Hairston, & Brooks,
2004). Primarily, the development of human capital theory has been pursued by Becker, who is
considered to be the founding father of the „economics of education‟ as a distinct research field
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(Zula & Chermack, 2007).
The fundamental assumption of human capital theory is that individuals rationally weigh
the benefits and costs of investing in their education and training in such a way as to maximize
their objective career success (Becker, 1993). According to this assumption, education and
training are the most important investments in human capital. People are motivated to invest in
their education because they expect such investment to result in greater career success, while
organizations are motivated to invest in employee training with the expectation that this
investment will increase their productivity and profitability. From the overall economic
perspective, the value of the investment in human capital is equal to the net present value of the
future expected cash flows (Becker, 1962). In economic terms, “profit maximizing firms
compete for utility maximizing workers, and the expected lifetime compensation of a worker
with a given set of observed characteristics is equal to the expected lifetime productivity of a
randomly selected worker with those characteristics” (Weiss, 1995, p. 136). In summary, human
capital theory explains variation in income generated from diverse forms of human capital
investments such as education and training (Becker, 1962).
Development of human capital through training, education, and tacit knowledge (i.e.,
tenure) are likely to lead to beneficial outcomes such as career success (Fang, Zikic, &
Novicevic, 2009). Development through training can be in the form of general or specific
training. General training is defined as training that yields generic knowledge, skills, and
abilities, and can be used and valued by other organizations beyond the one providing the
training (Becker, 1962). In contrast, specific training involves developing knowledge that is
uniquely beneficial to the organization that is offering the training. In his later work, Becker
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(1993) broadened the scope of organizations that may benefit from specific training beyond the
particular organization offering the training to other firms within the same industry. Therefore,
specific training may yield a set of skills that could be transferable across jobs within a specific
industry. In this case, workers are compensated for skills that are not general or firm specific but
rather industry specific (Neal, 1995; Parent, 2000). The distinction between general and specific
training has potential implications for employee mobility. Specifically, employees with greater
general training will become more marketable in the labor market and therefore may not develop
a sense of loyalty or attachment to the firm offering the training. In contrast, when firm specific
training is offered to an employee, that individual will be less likely to turnover as his or her
skills are less marketable to other firms while his or her value to the current employer will be
enhanced (Becker, 1993).
In addition to developing their human capital through training, individuals may develop
their human capital through schooling (i.e., formal education), experience, or tenure (Becker,
1993). Complementarity of these sources of human capital development is supported by past
research that suggests that human capital is the result of the development of ability, education,
and skills (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, & Sianesi, 1999).
Human capital theory suggests that formal education, specific training, and experience
accumulated by working in the firm over time (i.e., tenure) enhance not only individual
performance but also individual career success in the form of increased compensation. Therefore,
investments in human capital offer benefits to the individual in terms of objective career success
(Becker, 1964).
Proposition 1: Investments in different components of human capital are related to
objective career success.
8

Human Capital Theory of Career Success: Managerial Facet
The assumptions of human capital theory are perfect competition for jobs, no barriers to
entry into particular occupations, as well as that pay differentials are due to differences in
productivity (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, & Sianesi, 1999). These assumptions reflect the
economic rationality that underlies the economic facet of human capital theory, which proposes
that investing in human capital is likely to translate into greater objective career success through
properly evaluated job performance. However, this perspective alone is idealistic, as it fails to
consider that: 1) employees may not be motivated to use all of their human capital for
organizational purposes, and 2) organizations have the discretion to create policies and practices
that may favorably or unfavorably influence how individuals use their human capital. Therefore,
the managerial facet of human capital reflects the way organizational policies and practices may
add what economists would call a “behavioral” spin to the traditional rational economic model of
human capital.
Performance evaluation is one of the most important human resource tools, which is used
as a means by which organizations leverage their human capital (Chiang & Birtch, 2010).
Effective evaluations have been shown to lead to numerous positive outcomes such as greater
employee productivity and quality, job satisfaction, commitment, and trust (Ghorpade, Chen, &
Caggiano, 1995; Gutherire, 2001; Kuvaas, 2008; Mayer & Davis, 1999; Pettijohn, Pettijohn, &
Amico, 2001). However, only in ideal cases, performance evaluations offer an “objective,
rational, and systematic way for organizations to manage workforce performance” (Chiang &
Birtch, 2010, p. 3).
The managerial facet of human capital theory complements the economic facet by
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suggesting that highly skilled or trained employees may exhibit behavior of withdrawing their
maximum rational effort when their performance is not appropriately evaluated and rewarded. In
other words, although they possess individual knowledge, skills, and abilities developed through
education, training, and tenure, these employees may perform below their potential because they
use their time and talent at their own discretion (Bailey, 1993). Therefore, the managerial facet of
human capital theory states that the human resource practice of performance evaluation needs to
be designed appropriately to affect employee motivation positively by encouraging employees to
work both harder and smarter for the benefit of the organization and to achieve objective career
success. Based on this managerial facet, one‟s on-the-job performance is hypothesized to be a
function of his or her ability, knowledge, and skills, as well as of effective performance-appraisal
policies and practices that induce motivation for superior performance (Huselid, 1995).
Pay, which is a proxy for objective career success, is a desired correlate of performance
evaluations that has received great attention of human resource (HR) professionals. The HR
policy of linking pay to performance evaluations has been referred to as pay-for-performance
(PFP). While the debate whether pay is a sufficient motivator to influence adequate performance
is not over, several meta-analyses have supported the pay-for-performance model (e.g. Jenkins,
Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; Locke, Feren, McCaleb, & Denny, 1980). Furthermore, most firms
seem to be using some form of PFP (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005), and the tendency for firms
to use PFP has been growing (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 2000).
The pay-for-performance literature suggests that the influence of this type of HR policy
on both motivation and performance is through incentive effects and sorting effects. Research
suggests that rewards that are proximal to the behaviors are rewarding and tend to be effective

10

motivators. Pay is considered to be a proximal reward and therefore an efficient form of
incentive. In contrast, sorting effects suggest that individuals are either attracted to or repelled
from different pay systems. Therefore, a pay-for-performance reward structure may attract
individuals with a particular profile, while repelling others (McNatt, Glassman, & McAfee,
2007). Based on the managerial facet of human capital theory, the extent to which the pay-forperformance pay structure will leverage human capital and motivate individuals to make use of
their knowledge, skills, and abilities acquired through education and training will depend on the
effectiveness of performance evaluation/appraisal policies and practices adopted by managers.
Proposition 2: When a pay-for-performance system is implemented, performance
evaluation scores explain the relationship between human capital components and
objective career success.

Human Capital Theory of Career Success: Institutional Facet
The institutional facet of human capital theory complements the economic and
managerial facets by addressing political, socio-cultural, and institutional pressures that
managers face. In other words, while the economic and managerial facets of human capital
theory provide an explanation for the mechanisms by which investments in human capital, along
with the appropriately designed performance evaluation policies and practices, increases
performance and eventually objective career success, these facets do not consider the political,
socio-cultural, and institutional context in which the policies and practices affecting performance
evaluations and objective career success are embedded. Specifically, the implementation of HR
policies and practices of performance evaluation and compensation that managers‟ design and
use is often constrained by formal and informal institutional pressures.
The institutional facet of human capital theory posits that performance evaluation and pay
11

practices are constrained by the environments in which they are embedded and therefore this
socially thick view of career success may be as explanatory as economic or managerial views.
This institutional facet proposes that a firm‟s performance evaluation and pay practices become
more similar (i.e., isomorphic) with the practices of other companies operating in the firm‟s field,
as the firm seeks in this way legitimacy of its stakeholders in order to improve its possibilities of
survival under competitive and institutional pressures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The specific
institutional pressures that influence a firm‟s HR practices to become isomorphic with other
firms‟ HR practices are: coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes, and normative pressures
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism results from formal and informal pressures
driven by resource dependency, cultural expectations, and regulations affecting the HR function.
Mimetic processes result from benefits of imitation or modeling of HR practices in terms of
reduced uncertainty. Finally, normative pressures stem from professionalization of HR personnel
and the formation of their professional networks that favor benchmarking.
Managers, facing coercive, mimetic, and normative institutional pressures, may differ in
their choices of strategic responses to these pressures (Oliver, 1991). In particular, managers‟
choices may vary from passive to proactive responses towards these pressures. Therefore,
whether HR managers respond passively or proactively to institutional pressures is likely to
impact the strength of the relationships among human capital, performance evaluations, and
career success.
Most common responses to institutional pressures are based on the labor market data
collected by consulting firms because their data reveal practices that are referent for the firm‟s
legitimacy (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010; York & Brown, 2008). The typical
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practices serve as a referent point to select strategic responses in terms of pay policies which may
be to lead, lag, or meet pay relative to the referent companies. A general assumption is that the
leading firms prefer to pay higher salaries in order to recruit higher quality personnel, and lower
their turnover (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).
Human resource practices of pay that are based on rewarding for social standing and
reputation have been referred to as symbolic HR practices. These practices are often the result of
conventions imposed by the sector in which the company operates (Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Zucker, 1987; Fernandez-Alees, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Valle-Cabrera, 2006). Managerial choice
of specific HR practices is symbolic and conventional because it is often influenced by cultural
values. While national culture significantly affects how people perceive their work and behave in
their work environment, this line of research has been largely overlooked in the career literature
(Heslin, 2005). Ferris and colleagues (2008, p. 147) suggest that performance evaluation system
“like other mechanisms of accountability, is subject to lapses and ineffectiveness, particularly
when all the various influences that operate on such mechanisms are not fully considered and
investigated… performance evaluation systems, as accountability mechanisms, are embedded
within complex social, emotional, cognitive, political, and relationship contexts, which need to
be understood in order to adequately interpret the results or outcomes derived from such
systems.” Due to this cultural embeddedness of performance evaluations and career success in
terms of pay (Inkson, Khapova, and Parker, 2007), cultural influence has recently attracted
growing interest from researchers (Kats, Van Emmerik, Blenkinsopp, & Khapova, 2010).
We know little about this cultural influence in developing countries because most
published research on career success has been based on studies conducted in the United States or
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other Western developed countries (Counsell, 2002; Pringle & Mallon, 2003). Therefore, it is
highly important to understand how larger societal processes and cultural influences (Khapova,
Arthur, & Wilderom, 2007) shape HR policies and perceptions of career success in developing
countries (e.g. Baruck, 2004; Thomas & Inkson, 2006). More specifically, it is important to
identify how cultural influence is mapped on performance evaluations and objective career
success in the context of developing countries (Khapova, Vinkenburg, & Arnold, 2009).
Due to cultural influence, managerial strategic responses in terms of adopted HR policies
and practices may be specific in developing countries (Lawler et al., 2010). Designing HR
policies and practices to match the particular cultures in which organizations are embedded, may
be a critical factor influencing career success (Newman & Nollen, 1996). “The unique norms,
values, and beliefs inherent in different cultures affect the way employees are motivated and
controlled as well as their equity, expectancy, and justice perceptions. Specifically, an appraisal
architecture developed and regarded as effective in one country may not be suitable on another
cultural setting” (Chiang & Birtch, 2010, p. 4). Therefore, performance evaluation is likely to be
affected by cultural influences because the performance appraisal process is greatly influenced
by norms, values, and beliefs espoused by a particular society (Chiang & Birtch, 2010). For
example, culture may influence the extent to which organizational politics are acceptable and/ or
tolerated.
Institutional pressures may influence objective career success through the policies and
practices adopted by HR managers (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010). For
example, HR managers are likely to formulate pay strategies that are isomorphic to those used by
their competitors. Furthermore, Coombs and Rosse (1992) suggest that “compensation practices
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are often based on customs, imitation of other firms, administrative convenience, and ad hoc
programs developed through narrow functional lenses” (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & FrancoSantos, 2010, p. 55).
Proposition 3: Institutional pressures influence managerial responses leading to a direct
relationship between the human capital components and objective career success.

The above three research propositions are integrated to propose a formal model shown in
Figure 1. This model depicts the relationships suggested by the three facets of human capital
theory of career success. In the following Chapter Two, each component of the model shown in
Figure 1 is described and the relationships between the components are hypothesized.

15
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CHAPTER 2
FORMAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
To model the three facets of the human capital theory of career success, the human
capital components are described in this Chapter Two, as well as their relationships with
performance evaluations and objective career success. These constructs and their hypothesized
relationships are depicted in the model shown in Figure 1.
Human Capital Components
Human capital reflects knowledge, skills, and abilities acquired through education,
experience, and training which are commonly called human capital components (Becker, 1962).
These components of human capital are described in the forthcoming section of this Chapter
Two and their hypothesized relationships with performance evaluation and career success are
formally articulated.
Education. Most research in the field of careers has used the economic facet of human
capital theory to examine the influence of education on career success (Judge, Cable, Boudreau,
& Bretz, 1995). Past studies indicate that education is positively associated with several
outcomes such as more promotions, higher pay, lower turnover, less absenteeism, and less
substance abuse (Weiss, 1995; Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). Focusing on pay that is
a proxy for objective career success, Becker (1993) suggests that pay of more educated and
trained employees is almost always higher than the pay of less educated and trained ones. Also,
Singh, Ragins, and Tharenou (2009) found education to be a significant predictor of pay even
17

after controlling for age, gender, organizational size, rank, industry type, and promotion history.
Even in the context of China, a country with different socio-cultural and institutional forces than
countries researched in the West, a significant positive relationship between education and pay
was found (Fleisher, Hu, Li, & Kim, 2010). Therefore, it is not surprising that in a meta-analysis
of career success, education was found to be the strongest predictor of pay (Ng, Eby, Sorensen,
& Feldman, 2005). In other words, the findings of empirical research support the claim that the
relationship between education and objective career success is significant (e.g. Nabi, 1999;
Howard, 1986; Melamed, 1996; Mincer, 1974).
The economic facet of human capital theory assumes that investing in education leads to
greater productivity, which is captured by performance evaluations (Daly, Hitchens, & Wagner,
1985; Mason & van Ark, 1994; Steedman & Wagner, 1987, 1989; Prais, Jarvis, & Wagner,
1989). This suggests that organizations will only invest in developing the educational component
of human capital to the extent that they can receive a satisfactory return on their investment in
the form of increased productivity. More recently, in a meta-analysis by Ng and Feldman (2009),
the authors found education to be a significant predictor of core task performance. In summary,
based on human capital theory and previous empirical research, performance evaluation scores
are likely to explain how education is mapped onto objective career success. Therefore, the
following hypothesis is provided:
Hypothesis 1: Performance evaluation scores will mediate the relationship between education
and objective career success in terms of pay.

Tenure as Firm-Specific Experience. The economic facet of the human capital theory suggests
that time spent in the firm will yield firm-specific knowledge that is expected to result in greater
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productivity and subsequently greater objective career success. Tenure is defined as the length of
employment with the organization of current employment (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar,
2001). The unique characteristic of the tenure component of human capital is that it is often pathdependent (Barney, 1991; Itami, 1987) in terms of tacit knowledge that can only be developed
along the trajectories of interactions in the specific work environment (Lepak & Snell, 2002;
Polanyi, 1967; Williamson, 1975).
The length of tenure signals to what extent both the organization and its employees are
motivated to remain in a lasting relationship. While the organization seeks a higher return on its
investment, employees accept that their mobility is restricted with tenure because it reduces their
uncertainty of searching for a new job. Extant literature indicates a positive relationship between
tenure and objective career success in terms of pay (Bronars & Famulari, 1997; Judge & Bretz,
1994). In particular, Boudreau, Boswell, and Judge (2001) found organizational tenure to
significantly influence objective career success in terms of pay in both the US and European
samples. Furthermore, tenure was found to be a significant predictor of pay in the meta-analysis
performed by Ng and colleagues (2005). Overall, it seems that while HR managers espouse that
the compensation system in their organizations is primarily based on performance, in practice
most firms primarily base rewards on seniority (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).
When tenure, along with the achieved seniority status, is mapped onto performance
evaluations, the length of an employees stay in a particular firm, along with the length of time in
their profession, is positively related to career success (Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995).
Specifically, Topel (1991) found that ten years of seniority resulted in pay raises of 25% while in
a replication of the same study, Altonji and Williams (2005) found a 10% increase in pay over a
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ten-year period. Obtaining similar findings, Williams (2009) found pay to increase by 1% per
year over the first ten years on the job in the UK. Changes in tenure typically lead to changes in
career success in terms of pay through a gradual process which may be influenced by the design
of the performance evaluation system. This indicates that performance evaluations may influence
the way in which tenure has impact on career success.
While the relationship between tenure and increase in pay has had strong support from
previous research, the relationship between tenure and productivity has yielded mixed findings.
The seminal study by Medoff and Abraham (1981) specifically tested the relationship between
tenure, productivity, and compensation and found that productivity (using performance
evaluations as a proxy) did not explain pay increases. In a replication of that study, Flabbi and
Ichino (2001) also found that performance did not mediate the relationship between tenure and
compensation. On the other hand, both theory as well as an important number of empirical
studies have supported the tenure-performance relationship (Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge,
1986; Hall & Hall, 1976; Sturman, 2003; Van Iddekinge, Ferris, Perrewe, Perryman, Blass, &
Heetderks, 2009). In summary, based on human capital theory and previous empirical research,
performance evaluation scores are likely to explain how tenure is mapped onto objective career
success. Therefore, the following is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 2: The performance evaluation scores will mediate the relationship between the
tenure component of human capital and objective career success in terms of pay.

Training. Training that is provided to employees can be either general or specific.
General training is a source of generic knowledge that can be used for the benefit of the
organization but is also portable to other organizations. In contrast, specific training provides
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knowledge specific to the firm offering the training and therefore it is virtually not portable. The
economic facet of human capital theory proposes that specific training will have a significant
impact on wages while general training will not be of influence (Melero, 2004).
Becker (1962) suggests taking an economic perspective that firms should pay employees
who received general training the same amount as they would earn elsewhere while paying those
with specific training a premium over their average market value. Also, individuals who receive
specific training are less likely to turnover than those with more general training (Becker, 1962).
As a result, their increases in pay will be more significant (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, &
Sianesi, 1999) because the knowledge acquired through specific training is less portable
(Blundell, Dearden, & Meghir, 1996; Lillard & Tan, 1992; Booth, 1993).
In line with the economic facet of human capital theory, specific training has been found
to consistently have a significant influence on objective career success (Blundell, Dearden,
Meghir, & Sianesi, 1999). For example, Singh et al. (2009) found a significant relationship
between training with pay even after controlling for age, gender, organizational size, rank,
industry type and promotional history. Furthermore, in a meta-analysis, Ng et al. (2005) found
training and skill development opportunities to influence significantly and positively objective
career success.
In line with the managerial facet of human capital theory, organizations are likely to offer
training expecting to witness the effects of their investment in the form of improved employee
performance. Training is expected to develop job-specific skills that enhance individual
performance (Salas, Prince, Bowers, Stout, Oser, & Cannon-Bowers, 1999) and therefore result
in greater productivity (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). Several empirical studies found a significant
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relationship between specific training and performance. In a longitudinal study, Van Iddekinge et
al. (2009) found that the training intercept and slope had significantly positive relationships with
customer service performance. The positive effects of training on productivity have been found
to exist both at the individual as well as organizational levels (Bartel, 1994).
Training offers employees numerous benefits beyond skill development. For example,
training may also influence work-place attitudes, self-efficacy, and motivation to apply the newly
learned knowledge and skills (Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993; Chen & Klimoski, 2007). Specific
training is expected to allow individuals to acquire firm and industry specific knowledge that
should enhance performance because of the acquired specific knowledge, skills, and abilities.
However, specific training will be mapped on one‟s objective career success over a period of
time to the extent performance is properly evaluated. In conclusion, based on human capital
theory and previous empirical research, performance evaluation scores are likely to explain how
specific training is mapped onto objective career success. Therefore, the following hypotheses is
proposed:
Hypothesis 3: Performance evaluation scores will mediate the relationship between specific
training and objective career success in terms of pay.

Performance Evaluation. The managerial facet of the human capital theory of career
success suggests that performance evaluations influence objective career success in terms of pay
only to the extent to which managers are able to devise appropriate pay-for-performance policies
and implement them as effective practices. These practices are effective when they motivate
employees to use their knowledge, skills, and abilities to their fullest extent. Various theories
provide explanations for the manner in which pay-for-performance policies and practices could
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align divergent goals of the principal and agent (i.e., agency theory, transaction cost economics),
reinforce desired behaviors (i.e., operant conditioning theory), motivate particular behaviors (i.e.,
expectancy theory), and attract individuals with desired characteristics (i.e., sorting effects)
(Chiang & Birtch, 2010). Three of the most frequently used incentive motivators in organizations
are money, social recognition, and feedback, with money being the most frequently used form of
motivation (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001). Empirical evidence, though somewhat equivocal,
suggests that money is an important motivator for most people (Rynes, Gerhart, Minette, 2004).
Through both sorting and incentive effects, pay-for-performance compensation systems have
been suggested to provide two advantages over fixed salary compensation 1) they insure that
higher quality employees are attracted, and 2) they motivate employees to use their knowledge,
skills, and abilities (Cadsby, Song, & Tapan, 2007).
Pay-for-performance has shown to be strongly related to individual performance
(Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998). Chiang and Birch (2010) found support for the pay-forperformance relationship and furthermore suggest that employees perceive a pay-forperformance HR policy as an investment in them that is made by the organization. Scott, Shaw
and Duffy (2008) found pay-for-performance as particularly effective when a clear link exists
between pay and performance, emphasizing that this clarity is especially for older employees.
Also, a study examining the interaction between compensation system (i.e., fixed wage versus
incentive-based) and task attractiveness indicated that pay-for-performance worked better under
conditions where the employee did not perceive the task as attractive (Fessler, 2003).
Furthermore, Lazear (1999, 2000) found that after switching from fixed-wages to a pay-forperformance compensation system, the firm experienced a 44 percent increase in output per
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worker, where half of this increase was due to incentive effects and the other half to sorting
effects. Cadsby, Song, and Tapon (2007) also found that the incentive and sorting effects of payfor- performance HR systems lead to 38% greater performance than fixed salaries.
In summary, several theoretical explanations, empirical results (i.e., Heneman, 1990) and
meta-analyses (i.e., Locke et al., 1980; Guzzo et al., 1985; Jenkins et al., 1998) show support for
the relationship between pay and performance. Based on the broad theoretical grounding and
strong empirical evidence, the following hypothesis is presented:
Hypothesis 4: Performance evaluation scores will have a positive significant relationship with
objective career success in terms of pay.

Overall, the economic and managerial facets of human capital theory indicate that the
mediating mechanism of the relationship between human capital and objective career success is
performance evaluation. However, the institutional facet of the theory of human capital indicates
that institutional pressures and socio-cultural factors may have a direct influence on pay in spite
of the mediating role of performance evaluation scores between the human capital components
and objective career success in terms of pay. As a result, because managers may give primacy in
pay to these factors rather than performance scores, performance evaluation scores may not be
the only significant factor influencing objective career success as measured by pay because
managers pressured by the institutional forces of benchmarking may reward reputation of
educational background and specificity of training independent of performance evaluation. The
common rationale that was provided for the practice is to secure the retention of well-educated
and well-trained employees (Humphreys, 2002).
Benchmarking practices commonly involve reliance on salary surveys that are often used
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as guidelines to align average pay for specific tiers of employees with the benchmarked group.
Therefore, the HR manager may respond to institutional pressures proactively by establishing
pay bands to fit the reference to the benchmarked ones. In effect, this alignment may bypass the
pay-for-performance system. As a result, changes in career success in terms of pay may be due to
the direct effects of the symbolic value of human capital that result from the alignment of pay
and go beyond the mediating effects of evaluated individual performance. Therefore, this
practice may result in a direct influence of human capital development on objective career
success in terms of pay in spite of the influence that performance evaluation scores may have on
pay (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).
The influence of human capital development on objective career success in terms of pay
may also be reinforced by the salience of socio-cultural factors. For example, the process of
performance evaluations may become a highly socialized and internally political process,
stimulating consensus that is typically expected to be achieved in organizations located in
developing countries. In cultures of developing countries that are low in assertiveness, high in
uncertainty avoidance, high in power distance, and high in in-group collectivism, managers may
not be assertive in implementing a strict pay-for-performance system as they may not want to
jeopardize group harmony. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 5: Managerial emphasis of symbolic aspects of human capital will lead to a
positive direct effect of a) education, b) tenure, and c) specific training on objective career
success in terms of pay.

Moderating Component
Rank. A more rigorous test for theory requires that we specify the boundary conditions
that may delimit the context within which the theory applies (Bacharach, 1989; Whetten, 1989).
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This implies focus on the most relevant moderators. In the domain of career success the
theoretically most relevant moderator is rank (managers and non-managers) as managers may be
perceived as entitled relative to non-managers. The grouping of employees into managers and
non-managers is relevant because economic and managerial facets of human capital theory do
not explain how HR policies and practices are structured and implemented across different ranks
within the organization. The grouping into managers and non-managers is relevant in the domain
of careers because managerial career success differs from non-managerial career success in three
ways (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000): 1) managerial decisions are difficult to
measure; 2) managers benefit from information asymmetries regarding organizational processes
and decisions; and 3) managers may use information to their own benefit before attempting to
generate benefits for the firm (Ammeter, Douglas, Gardner, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2002; Lepak
& Snell, 2002).
Managerial performance is more difficult to measure than non-managerial performance
because “high levels of interdependence often make it difficult to isolate individual managers‟
contributions to outcomes” (Wood, Atkins, & Bright, 1999, p. 703). In other words, traditional
reward systems may sometimes be inappropriate for managerial positions because of the
difficulty of measuring the individual manager‟s outcomes (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & FrancoSantos, 2010). Therefore, managers are typically compared to the evaluations of other managers
to help ensure internal equity and the desired distribution of bonuses within the budget (Wood,
Atkins, & Bright, 1999).
The institutional facet of the human capital theory of career success also suggests that
culture may have a strong influence on differentiating managerial pay from the pay of non-
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managers (Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004). For example, the high level of power distance is expected
to influence the acceptance of larger pay differential between managerial and non-managerial
groups. In addition, in cultures where differences in social status and positions of power are more
socially accepted, it is more acceptable for managers not only to have higher pay levels but also
to have more discretion to influence their pay (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).
For a typical organization, the pool of potential individuals who could be hired for
managerial positions is commonly limited (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010). As
the market for higher-ranked managers is segmented based on firm size and industry the
potential applicant pool is even further reduced (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005).
Frequently, the number of the subordinates and the level of resources managers are responsible,
rather than their evaluated performance, are of influence on their level of pay (Gomez-Mejia,
Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).
Overall, consistent with human capital theory, managers tend to have more years of
education and experience, and make more personal sacrifice and investment in their careers than
non-managers do. In other words, “few people have the ability, stamina, or willingness to pay the
associated personal price in terms of stress, family life, loss of privacy, and minimal leisure time.
So their higher pay may be seen as a return on this human capital investment (Gerhart and
Malkovich, 1990; Buck et al., 2008)” (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010, p. 135).
Furthermore, research has shown greater returns for managerial training than for non-managerial
training (Lillard and Tan, 1992; Bartel, 1995; Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, & Sianesi, 1999). In
light of those differences, Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, (1988) found that pay is seldom based on
performance at the managerial level. Also, Flabbi and Ichino (2001) found that rank mattered
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because only at the lowest levels of the firm performance explained objective career success.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: Rank will moderate the relationship between performance evaluation scores and
pay such that the relationship between performance evaluations scores and pay will be
stronger for non-managers than for managers.

Influential Variables Beyond Those Hypothesized in the Theoretical Model
Demographic factors have been found to influence different behavioral patterns and
outcomes, including promotions and pay attainment (Pfeffer, 1981; Judge, Cable, Boudreau, &
Bretz, 1995). Research findings suggest that demographic variables are important predictors of
career success for both managers and non-managers (Gattiker & Larwood, 1988, 1989; Judge,
Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). As the theoretical and empirical focus of this paper is to
examine how different components of human capital and performance evaluation influence
objective career success, demographic variables (age, gender, marital status, and number of
dependents) are used only as control variables.
Age. Age has been consistently found to be a predictor of objective career success (Cox
& Nkomo, 1991; Gattiker & Larwood, 1988, 1989; Gutteridge, 1973; Harrell, 1969; Jaskolka,
Beyer, & Trice, 1985), presumably because extrinsic outcomes accrue over time (Judge et al.,
1995). In particular, Judge and colleagues (1995) found that older individuals had higher pay
than did younger individuals. More recently, in a meta-analysis, Ng and colleagues (2005) found
age and career success in terms of pay to have a significant positive relationship.
Research of aging and performance evaluations has yielded mixed results. One line of
research has shown that aging negatively influences individual performance because over time
older individuals lose certain important abilities, such as speed, dexterity, motor coordination
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and strength (Giniger, Dispenzieri, & Eisenberg, 1983; Rhodes, 1983). Age has also been shown
to be associated with decreases in performance on tests of learning, memory, reasoning, spatial
abilities, and psychomotor speed (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991;
Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997). More recently, research suggests that age is negatively related
to objective performance measures during training (Hirschfeld & Thomas, in press). However, in
socially-rich tasks, the findings about the relationship between age and performance have been
inconsistent (Rhodes, 1983; McEnvoy & Cascio, 1989; Waldman & Avolio, 1986).
Aging has also been shown to influence motivation and social perceptions, which are the
factors that influence performance and pay (objective career success). Research findings suggest
that age is negatively related to general motivation (Judge & Hulin, 1993; Judge & Locke, 1993),
pay increases (Siegel & Ghiselli, 1971), and training opportunities (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir,
& Sianesi, 1999). From an economic perspective, organizations offer older employees fewer
training and networking opportunities as they are expected to remain less time in the workforce
and therefore offer the firm a lower return on investment (Blundell, 1999; Kuhlen, 1977;
Lawrence, 1988). In summary, age is expected to influence both pay and performance, and
therefore needs to be included as a control variable in the proposed model.
Gender. A considerable amount of research suggests that women do not achieve the
same level of objective career success as men do (Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). For
example, Judge et al. (1995) found that men in general achieved higher pay levels than did
women. Gender stereotyping explanations may shed light why women seldom achieve the same
level of objective career success as their male counterparts. Kanter (1977) suggests that
traditional stereotypes impede women from pursuing the same path of career development as
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men do. In a more recent work, Tharenou (1997) suggests that discrimination against women is
based on employers‟ expectations that women will underperform men, and therefore may be
inclined to leave the organization sooner than men do.
One common explanation for the gap in gender pay has been women‟s temporary
absence from work during pregnancy while having young children. These derailing instances
may create fewer incentives for women to invest in their education and training (Becker, 1993).
Women, with children also are less likely to receive proper training than men are because they
are expected to remain employed for shorter periods of time (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, &
Sianesi, 1999). In the meta-analysis by Ng et al. (2005), gender was found to moderate the
relationship between education level and career success in terms of pay as well as between
organizational tenure and pay. This indicates that gender does have a significant impact on
performance evaluations and career success and therefore, this variable needs to be controlled in
the proposed model.
Marital status. A relatively consistent finding in the literature on careers is that married
individuals achieve higher levels of objective career success than unmarried individuals (Judge
and Bretz, 1994; Pfeffer & Ross, 1982; Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). According to
Pfeffer and Ross (1982), spouses can be a valuable support when they can alleviate some of the
burden of household chores and offer emotional support. For example, Judge and colleagues
(1995) found that married individuals earned higher income than unmarried individuals did.
However, if the spouse were also employed outside of the home, then this changed status would
likely influence a negative relationship between marital status and career success (Judge, Cable,
Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). Furthermore, the meta-analysis performed by Ng et al. (2005) found
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the relationship between married couples and objective career success in terms of pay was
stronger than that of non-married couples. Based on the effect of marital status on objective
career success, this variable needs to be controlled in the proposed model.
Number of dependents. The influence of the number of dependents on objective career
success has been met with mixed results. On the one hand, the number of dependents has been
suggested to influence career success positively (Bielby & Bielby, 1989; Judge, Cable,
Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995), as children foster career stability and job commitment (Stroh, Brett,
& Reilly, 1996). On the other hand, it is likely that the larger the number of dependents, the more
time and energy needs to be spent on the family members, and therefore less time can be
devoted/ dedicated to furthering one‟s career. In any case, this variable needs to be controlled.
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CHAPTER 3
DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND RESULTS
This study uses a cross-sectional design and path analysis to test the extended human
capital theory of career success in the context of a developing country with salient institutional
and socio-cultural pressures. For this design, secondary data for the years 2009 and 2010
(performance lagged one year) on 1,042 employees was obtained from a major Ecuadorian
financial services company. Observations with missing data on any of the substantive variables
of interest were eliminated from the study using listwise deletion. The number of employees with
complete secondary information used in this study is 782 (624 non-managers and 158 managers)
representing 75 percent of the total population of employees. Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics and intercorrelations for independent, dependent, and control variables.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Variables
M
Gender
0.53
Marital
0.59
Status
# Dependents
1.10
Age
34.10
Tenure
6.72
Education
15.53
Specific
1.02
Training
Performance
4.28
Evaluation
Pay (2010)
818.62
Rank
1.20

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics, and Intercorrelations
SD
1
2
3
4
0.50
0.49 .12**

5

6

7

1.17
7.98
5.38
1.76
2.65

.18**
.13**
.03
-.02
-.02

.53**
.28**
.22**
-.08
.04

.55**
.38**
-.22**
.04

.68**
-.23** -.17**
.08*
.01

.16

0.35

-.02

.03

-.04

-.05

.06

.05

832.53
0.40

.03
-.04

.10**
.06

.17**
.08*

.21**
.08*

.22**
.16**

.33**
.24**

-.02
.23**
.28**
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Note: N= 782; * p<.05 (two-tailed), ** p< .01 (two-tailed); Gender (1=male, 0=female);
Rank (1= non-managers, 2= managers).
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8

9

.11**
.14**

.56**

10

Measures of Independent Variables
Years of Education. The total number of formal years of education for each employee
was calculated as the sum of the years of high school, undergraduate, diploma‟s, and MBA. The
number of years of education assumed to be completed for each level of formal education was as
follows: individuals completing high school were assumed to have completed 12 years of
education; individuals with an undergraduate degree were assumed to have completed 4 years of
education; individuals having completed a graduate diploma were assumed to have completed
one year of education; and those who completed an MBA were assumed to have completed two
years of education.
The base number of years of education for individuals who completed high school was
set at twelve to represent the twelve years of schooling before college. To this base, the number
years of education beyond secondary schooling was added. For example, individuals who
completed an undergraduate degree had four years of education added to the twelve years of high
school for a sum of sixteen years of total education. Also, common in Ecuador are postgraduate
diplomas/certificates that typically last one year. These certificates are considered an option for
those individuals who cannot afford or do not have time to pursue an MBA program. Individuals
completing this postgraduate certificate/ diploma had one year added to the previous sixteen
years, for a total of seventeen years of education. Individuals who completed a masters‟ degree
were coded as receiving two years of education (typically MBA programs in Ecuador last two
years) which was added to the total number of years. In the cases where individuals had more
than one diploma and/ or MBA degree, the corresponding number of years were also added to
the total. The sum of the years from undergraduate, postgraduate, and masters‟ degrees yielded
the total accumulated number of years of education at a given time, which is the measure for the
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years of education used in this study. While ideally determining whether an individual was
currently enrolled in or had already completed a specific diploma would have been preferred, the
available secondary data did not specify these details. Therefore, the assumption was made that
the degree pursued was eventually completed.
The total number of years of education ranged from twelve to twenty-one with a mean of
15.52 (s.d. = 1.76). Approximately 17 percent of the individuals had a high school degree, 74
percent had a four-year undergraduate degree, and the remaining 9 percent of individuals had
some form of graduate degree.
Tenure. Tenure was operationalized as the number of years from the time of employment
until the time of this study. The tenure ranged from 1 to 36 years with a mean of 6.72 (s.d. =
5.38) years.
Training. The firm provides both internal (generic) and external (specific) training for its
employees. Internal training was considered by the firm to be generic because versions of the
same type of internal training were offered in most other firms. This type of training was not
included in this study as human capital theory, as conceptualized by Becker, suggests that
specific training and not general training influence career success. Specific training was
operationalized as the total number of independent courses an employee participated in
externally since the day of initial employment with the firm. The number of courses in which
individuals participated was used instead of a more accurate measure such as number of hours of
training because the exact number of hours per course was not available. The assumption was
that the number of courses in which an employee participates should increase knowledge, skills,
and abilities, and ultimately influence performance appraisals and career success in terms of pay.
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The percent of employees who participated in general (internal) training is approximately
24 percent with a mean of .53 (s.d. = 1.39). The percent of employees who participated in
specific (external) training is 30 percent with a mean of 1.02 (s.d. = 2.65).
Performance evaluation. The yearly performance evaluations scores were measured
using a 5-point likert type scale with 1 (one) indicating poor performance and 5 (five) indicating
excellent performance. The procedure used for scoring the performance appraisal by the
supervisors involved the following steps: 1) Each employee established yearly goals and
provided self-evaluations against these goals; 2) Each employee was evaluated by his or her
supervisor as to the attainment of the goals established by the employee and by the organization;
3) The employee and the supervisor were expected to meet and reach a consensus as to the final
evaluation score; 4) In the case that an agreement was not reached, a representative from the
human resource department was assigned to act as a mediator between the employee and the
supervisor; 5) If even after the involvement of the mediator an agreement could not be reached,
the score proposed by the supervisor took precedence and remained as the final evaluation score.
The mean performance evaluation score is 4.28 (s.d. = .35).
Measure of Moderating Variable
Rank. The rank of the employees of the financial services firm are divided into six
categories: presidency, management, assistant management, chief, supervisory, and other levels.
For the purposes of this study, individuals working in the presidency, managerial, assistant
managerial, chief or supervisory role were categorized as managers. All individuals labeled by
the firm to be working in “other levels” were categorized as non-managers. Non-managers
represent 82 percent of the sample and managers represent 18 percent of the sample.
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Measure of Dependent Variable
Objective career success in terms of pay. Pay in Ecuador is typically calculated on a
monthly basis in terms of the basic fixed monthly salary. In order to normalize the data, a natural
logarithmic transformation was performed and the resulting outcome was used for the analysis.
The objective career success variable does not include any variable portions of the salary,
bonuses or any additional compensation required by Ecuadorian law. Salaries have a broad range
from $240 per month to almost $9,000 per month with a mean salary of $818.62 per month
(s.d.= 832.53).
Measures of Control Variables
Age. Age was determined by the number of months from birth until the time when this
study was conducted. Ages ranged from 21 to 64 with a mean age of 34 (s.d.= 7.98).
Gender. The gender variable will be coded 1 for male and 0 for female. The sample was
fairly balanced with 46 percent female and 54 percent male.
Marital status. Marital status was coded 1 for married and 0 for single. The percent of
employees that were not married in this sample represented 40 percent of all employees while
the married employees represented 60 percent.
Number of dependents. The number of dependents was self-reported and
operationalized as the number of immediate family members who were financially dependent on
the employee and were under the age of 18. Forty-two percent of the sample does not have
children, while 58 percent had between one and six children.
Results of Structural Model
The data was analyzed using path analysis in Mplus version 6. Path analysis offers the
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benefit of assessing the fit of the overall proposed model, as well as the specific relationships
among the variables (LeBreton, Wu, & Bing, 2008).
Three indices were used to determine model fit: chi-square (2), comparative fit index
(CFI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). The theoretical model resulted in
a chi-square= 19.48 (d.f.= 5), CFI= .97, and RMSEA= .06. Values of .95 or higher for CFI and
.06 or lower for RMSEA are considered to result in good fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). Overall, the
results suggest good fit of the theoretical model.
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TABLE 2
Structural Equation Modeling Results

Theoretical
Model
Paths Modeled

Parameter
Coefficient

t-Value

p-Value

0.01
0.01
0.00

1.34
1.27
-0.29

0.179
0.203
0.773

Education
Specific Training
Tenure

Perf. Eval.
Perf. Eval.
Perf. Eval.

Gender
Age
Marital Status
# Dependents
Education
Specific Training
Tenure
Rank

Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay

0.02
0.03
0.08
-0.07
0.09
0.02
0.00
0.82

0.65
8.48
1.89
-3.43
8.15
2.52
-0.76
17.15

0.515
0.000
0.059
0.001
0.000
0.012
0.445
0.000

Perf. Eval.
Perf. Eval. X Rank

Pay
Pay

0.22
-0.33

4.42
-2.49

0.000
0.013

Note. N= 782. Overall fit: 2= 19.48, d.f.= 5, p<.01, CFI= .97, RMSEA= .06.
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Hypothesis Testing
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, of the proposed model, reflecting the economic facet of the
theory of human capital of career success, predict that performance evaluation scores will have a
positive mediating relationship between the human capital components and objective career
success in terms of pay. One of the basic requirements for mediation is that predictor variables
be significantly related to the mediating variable (LeBreton, Wu, & Bing, 2008). For this model,
the results of the analysis indicate that none of the human capital components has a relationship
of statistical significance with performance evaluation scores (years of formal education = .01,
t= 1.34, p = .18; tenure = .00, t= -.29, p = .77; specific training = .01, t= 1.27, p = .20).
Therefore the proposed hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are not supported.
Hypothesis 4, of the proposed model, reflecting the managerial facet of the human capital
theory of career success, predicts a significant relationship between performance evaluation
scores and objective career success in terms of pay. This hypothesis is supported, as performance
evaluation scores (= .22, t= 4.42, p< .001) did indicate a significant positive relationship with
objective career success in terms of pay.
Hypothesis 5, of the proposed model, reflecting the institutional facet of the human
capital theory of career success, predicts significant relationships between the human capital
components and objective career success in terms of pay. This hypothesis is supported for the
components of, years of formal education (= .09, t= 8.15, p< .001) and specific training (= .02,
t= 2.52, p = .01), which significantly influence career success, but not for the component of
tenure (= .00, t= -.76, p= .45), which does not have a significant relationship with career
success in terms of pay.
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Hypothesis 6, which is related to the boundary condition of the proposed model predicts
the moderating effect of the rank variable on the relationship between performance evaluation
scores and objective career success in terms of pay. Specifically, hypothesis 6 predicts that
performance evaluation scores have a greater influence on career success as pay for nonmanagers than for managers. Both performance evaluation scores and rank were mean-centered
before creating the interaction term. The results indicate that the interaction has a significant
influence (= -.33, t= -2.49, p = .01) on objective career success in terms of pay (see Figure 3).
Therefore, hypothesis 6 is supported. This result indicates that as rank increases, the significance
of the relationship between performance evaluation scores and pay decreases.
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Post-hoc Analysis
Given the significant moderating effect of rank on the dependent variable of career
success in terms of pay, it seems worthwhile to analyze the proposed model separately for each
group. This post-hoc analysis may identify differences that were not accounted for by the
original hypotheses, and any interpretation should be limited given the sample-specific nature of
this investigation. However, any identified differences may prove beneficial for extending this
work in the future.
To test the proposed model comparatively for managers and non-managers, subjects were
grouped by their rank, and the structural model was run for each of the two groups using the
“grouping” function in Mplus. This procedure allows an opportunity to examine the relationships
proposed by the model for managers and non-managers independently and then compare the
results for these two groups. Of the 782 total subjects, 624 are non-managers and 158 are
managers. The results of the analysis for non-managers are presented in Table 3 in a tabular form
and in Figure 4 in a graphical form, while the results for managers are presented in Table 4 in a
tabular form and in Figure 5 in a graphical form. The test of the proposed model upon grouping
managers and non-managers indicates good fit with a chi-square= 18.46 (d.f.= 8), CFI= .95, and
RMSEA= .06.
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TABLE 3

Structural Equation Modeling Results

Theoretical Model (Non-managers)
Parameter
Coefficient
t-Value
p-Value

Paths Modeled
Education
Specific Training
Tenure

Perf. Eval.
Perf. Eval.
Perf. Eval.

0.01
0.01
0.00

0.80
1.58
-0.28

0.423
0.114
0.779

Gender
Age
Marital Status
# Dependents
Education
Specific Training
Tenure

Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay

0.01
0.02
0.08
-0.08
0.08
0.03
0.00

0.37
5.80
1.93
-3.68
6.77
3.79
-0.01

0.714
0.000
0.054
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.990

Perf. Eval.

Pay

0.28

5.59

0.000

Note. N= 624. Overall fit: 2= 18.46, d.f.= 8, p=.02, CFI= .95, RMSEA= .06.
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TABLE 4

Structural Equation Modeling Results

Theoretical Model (Managers)
Parameter
Coefficient
t-Value
p-Value

Paths Modeled
Education
Specific Training
Tenure

Perf. Eval.
Perf. Eval.
Perf. Eval.

0.01
0.00
-0.01

0.64
-0.61
-2.40

0.526

Gender
Age
Marital Status
# Dependents
Education
Specific Training
Tenure

Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay
Pay

0.04
0.06
0.09
0.01
0.09
0.00
-0.02

0.46
7.17
0.81
0.11
3.99
-0.16
-1.68

0.643

Perf. Eval.

Pay

0.19

1.26

0.209

Note. N= 158. Overall fit: 2= 18.46, d.f.= 8, p=.02, CFI= .95, RMSEA= .06.
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0.543
0.017

0.000
0.421
0.916
0.000
0.876
0.093

The results of testing the economic facet of the theory of human capital of career success
in terms of pay indicate that the relationship between the human capital components and
performance evaluations for the non-manager group, is not statistically significant (years of
formal education = .01, t= .80, p = .42; tenure = .00, t= -.28, p = .78; specific training = .01,
t= 1.58, p = .11). The results for the managerial group, indicate that two human capital
components have statistically non-significant relationships with performance evaluation scores
(years of formal education = .01, t= .64, p = .53; specific training = .00, t= -.61, p = .54),
while the tenure component of human capital has a significant relationship (tenure = -.01, t=
-2.40, p = .02) with performance evaluation scores. Interestingly, the significance of this
relationship is in the opposite direction from the predicted direction indicating potential leniency
toward externally-recruited managers, which should be further researched.
The results of testing the managerial facet of the human capital theory of career success,
for non-managers, indicate that performance evaluation scores (= .28, t= 5.59, p< .001) have a
significant positive relationship with objective career success in terms of pay. In contrast, the
performance evaluation scores of managers (= .19, t= 1.26, p = .21) do not have a significant
relationship with pay. These results support the interaction effect found in the original analysis,
indicated that, as hypothesized, a boundary condition of the theoretical model is set by rank.
The results of testing the institutional facet of the human capital theory of career success,
for non-managers, indicate that years of formal education (= .08, t= 6.77, p< .001) and the level
of specific training (= .03, t= 3.79, p< .001) have a significant influence on career success in
terms of pay. This support for the theoretical predictions based on the institutional facet was not
found for length of tenure (= .00, t= -.01, p = .99) that did not significantly influence career
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success in terms of pay of non-managers. The results of testing these relationships for managers
indicate that years of formal education (= .09, t= 3.99, p< .001) significantly influence career
success in terms of pay. Therefore, years of formal education significantly influence career
success in terms of pay for both the non-managerial and managerial samples. However, in the
case of managers, specific training (= .00, t= -.16, p = .88) and the length of tenure (= -.02, t=
-1.68, p= .09) do not show a significant influence on career success in terms of pay. Therefore,
the predictions based on the institutional facet of human capital of career success are supported
for the human capital component of education for both the managerial and non-managerial
groups. While the prediction for specific training is supported only for the non-managerial group,
the prediction of significant influence of tenure on career success in terms of pay was not found
either for non-managers or managers.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
The main purpose of this dissertation is to extend the theory of human capital of career
success by complementing the traditional economic human capital facet with the social
institutional facet that takes into account managerial responses to socio-cultural and other
environmental pressures, and the behavioral managerial facet that takes into account the
influence of HR policies and practices on objective career success. The integration of these
facets allows researchers to examine multiple theoretical pathways of human capital impact on
objective career success in terms of pay. An additional purpose of the dissertation was to identify
a possible boundary condition of the extended theory.
The results of the analysis of the proposed extension of human capital theory of career
success indicate that in socially thick environments, such as those found in Latin American
countries, institutional and managerial facets of human capital theory provide a better
explanation as to how human capital translates into objective career success than does the
economic facet. In other words, the main prediction of the economic facet of the theory that the
greater accumulation of human capital results in higher performance evaluations and
consequently to higher pay was generally not supported by this study conducted in the
Ecuadorian context where only managerial and institutional facets proved to be generally
significant.
The institutional facet of the theory of human capital of career success posits that
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individuals will achieve greater career success based on the symbolic rather than economic value
of their formal education and training. The results from the analyses indicate that education
influences objective career success directly, while having no significant influence in a mediated
way through performance evaluation scores. In allocating pay, managers appear to be influenced
primarily by institutional pressures such as those coming from benchmarking based on the use of
salary surveys. The manager may also be influenced by the symbolic value of the employees‟
degrees obtained through formal education when they allocate pay to both non-managers and
managers. This finding of significant symbolic rather than economic value of education for
objective career success is important because there is a paucity of research addressing
institutional pressures coming from external labor markets or socio-cultural environment and
influence objective career success (Dulebohn & Werling, 2007). This is particularly relevant
because numerous authors (i.e., Fernandez-Alees, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Valle-Cabrera, 2006)
have suggested that certain human capital components (i.e., years of formal education) may
provide a signal as to an individuals knowledge, skills, and abilities and thus influence objective
career success in terms of pay beyond the influence of performance evaluations. Therefore, the
lack of support for performance evaluations as the explanatory mechanism between education
and pay in the institutional context of a developing country (Ecuador) may suggest noneconomic factors may be influencing managerial decisions regarding employee pay.
The institutional explanation of objective career success also suggests that the symbolic
value of specific training may significantly influence objective career success in terms of pay.
The results from this study indicate support for this hypothesis based on the institutional facet of
the human capital theory of career success. However, once managers and non-managers are
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compared in the post-hoc analysis, the obtained results suggest that only non-managers are
rewarded through higher pay (i.e., objective career success) for participating in specialized
training. This means that only the results for non-managers support the institutional facet of
human capital theory that predicts that individuals will receive a higher pay based on the
symbolic value of their training and/ or based on the assessed demand for such training in the
external labor market (i.e., which is benchmarked based on salary surveys). In contrast to nonmanagers, managers are not rewarded for attending specialized training seminars, most likely
because the marginal benefit of training for non-managers is perceived to be greater than that for
managers thus resulting in its greater impact on non-managerial than managerial compensation.
Although hypothesized as significant, based on the institutional facet, tenure does not
have a significant influence on objective career success in terms of pay for either non-managers
or managers. This means that specific tacit knowledge acquired over years of working at a
particular firm is not rewarded as pay (Altonji & Williams, 2005). This finding is consistent, in
part, with previous research that suggests that unskilled workers benefit more from staying at a
particular job while skilled workers benefit much less. In other words, “for skilled workers
human capital is transferable and tenure is not as important” (Dustmann & Meghir, 2005, p. 79).
As the sample for this dissertation was obtained from a firm in the financial services industry,
where the majority of employees are skilled workers, the non-significant results for the tenurepay relationship from this dissertation mirrors the results from other studies from the career
success literature. Also, research from the United Kingdom and the United States suggests that,
while the impact of seniority on wages is modest for union workers, it becomes negligible for
nonunion workers (Williams, 2009). As the sample of this particular study was obtained from a
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non-unionized firm, the results are consistent with the results from other studies with nonunionized labor.
The non-significant relationship between tenure and career success in terms of pay for
non-managers and managers also suggests that, regardless of the knowledge individuals
accumulate over time, they may not meet the formal educational requirements in order to obtain
promotions into positions with higher educational requirements (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, &
Franco-Santos, 2010). This inference is consistent with the institutional facet of human capital
theory in that different forms of human capital may be granted different levels of legitimacy
across organizations. In other words, degrees obtained through formal education may have more
symbolic value, and therefore greater legitimacy, than tenure may have. Therefore, in a
competitive environment, organizations may be more willing to pay for the explicit symbolic
value of degrees, than for implicit value implied to have been accrued through years of
experience.
The managerial facet of the theory of human capital of career success suggests that
performance evaluations and pay will be related only to the extent to which appropriate policies
are implemented as practices to motivate individuals to use their knowledge, skills, and abilities
to their fullest extent. The results obtained in this study support this hypothesis indicating that
personnel with higher performance evaluations also have greater objective career success. More
specifically, performance evaluation scores influence career success in terms of pay to a greater
extent for non-managers than for managers. This finding supports the notion that at managerial
levels, performance evaluations become more ambiguous and more difficult to measure and that
at those levels, career success may be more the result of managerial responses to institutional
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pressures and not to performance evaluations. Also, given the collectivistic culture and power
distance that exists between non-managers and managers in Latin America, the finding supports
the hypothesized inference that managers are not held to the same standards as non-managers. In
particular, the results from the study show that performance evaluation scores are an important
consideration for the objective career success of non-managers while not important for
managers.
The economic facet of the theory of human capital of career success points to
performance evaluations as the explanatory mechanism for the relationships between the human
capital components and objective career success in terms of pay. However, in this study none of
the human capital components (i.e., formal education, specific training, and tenure) influence
performance evaluations. The finding that the economic facet does not explain objective career
success, while the institutional and managerial facets do, is intriguing. This finding is interesting
because it suggests that the claim of human capital theory that greater human capital results in
greater performance does not seem to apply in a highly socialized context with strong
institutional forces that may influence managerial decision-making such as that found in
Ecuador. In other words, in highly socialized environments such as Latin America, greater
importance appears to be placed on the symbolic value of education in applying pay for
performance compensation HR practices while ignoring the link between human capital
development and performance. This perspective is consistent with the findings of Medoff and
Abraham (1980, 1981) as well as the replication of the same study by Flabbi and Ichino (2001),
suggesting that performance evaluations do not explain the relationship of seniority and wages as
suggested by human capital theory. Therefore, this theme requires further in-depth research.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The drivers of environmental changes such as globalization, hypercompetition, trade
liberalization, deindustrialization, decrease in unionization, outsourcing, downsizing have
influenced a shift away from manufacturing industries to more knowledge and service dominant
industries thus altering the organization-employee relationship. As a result, human resource
policies and practices have moved away from offering employees stable life-long employment
with progressive promotion opportunities to requiring their responsiveness to market factors (i.e.,
with the rewards based on benchmarking of salaries) and performance (i.e., with competencybased pay) (Dulebohn & Werling, 2007). These changes require researchers to develop a better
understanding of the factors influencing objective career success. Also, as the focus of past
research on career success has taken place in developed countries, there is a need to understand
how objective career success is achieved in developing countries. This dissertation addresses this
need by integrating three complementary facets (i.e., economic, managerial, and institutional) of
the human capital theory of career success to identify influences on career success in a context of
socio-cultural and institutional pressures of a developing country (i.e., Ecuador). The results
from this dissertation offer both theoretical as well as practical implications.
Research Implications
This dissertation extends existing career success research by integrating three
complementary facets of human capital theory to explain objective career success. The model
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developed based on these facets is tested for an explanation of how objective career success is
achieved in a developing country environment with strong socio-cultural and institutional
pressures. This testing of multiple theoretical facets implies theory pruning (Gray & Cooper,
2010). Theory pruning techniques allows for “limiting, bounding, and perhaps reducing theory,
outside a large, multistudy framework” (Leavitt, Mitchell, and Peterson, 2010). Van de Ven and
Johnson (2006, p. 814) suggest that “one has a much greater likelihood of making important
knowledge advances to theory and practice if the study is designed so that it juxtaposes and
compares competing plausible explanations of the phenomena being investigated.”
Owing to the employment of the theory pruning approach, the results of this study
challenge the primary assumption of the economic facet of human capital theory, which suggests
performance evaluations as the explanatory link between human capital development and
objective career success, for alternative theoretical explanations for the relationships between
human capital and objective career success. More specifically, the institutional and managerial
facets appear to be driving objective career success in terms of pay in the Latin American
context. In this way, human capital theory of career success was theoretically and empirically
pruned.
The approach used in this dissertation responds to a call for careers researchers to
consider how environmental factors influence career success (Dulebohn & Werling, 2007)
beyond traditional internal labor market factors. They suggest that given the shift to a
knowledge- based economy has diminished the importance of firm-specific knowledge and has
placed more emphasis on industry-specific knowledge. The findings from this dissertation appear
to support the claim that institutional forces influence managerial decisions regarding pay. In
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other words, as suggested by the institutional facet proposed in this dissertation, objective career
success is strongly influenced by factors external to a specific job performance metric.
Practical Implications
Dulebohn and Werling (2007) suggest that there still remains a disconnect between
academic research and actual human resource practices regarding pay. This study tries to breach
the academic practitioner gap by considering alternative complementary explanations (i.e.,
economic, managerial, and institutional) for objective career success and testing these
explanations using one firm with rich secondary data. The results from this study offer several
practical implications for both individuals and organizations. From an individual perspective, the
findings suggest that non-managers, in a Latin American context, have three ways to further their
objective career success in terms of pay: 1) by pursuing more years of formal education, 2) by
participating in specific on the job training, and 3) by elevating their performance evaluations.
Managers, on the other hand, can achieve greater objective career success solely through more
years of formal education. This last finding is especially interesting given the significant negative
relationship between years of tenure and performance evaluations. It appears, therefore, that
managers are able to attain greater objective career success in terms of pay despite the scores on
their performance evaluations. These findings support the institutional facet that suggests that
managers, especially in societies with strong in-group collectivism and high power distance, are
rewarded on the symbolic basis of their years of education. Also, these findings lend support to
suggestions that money has greater instrumental value at lower organizational levels and
therefore may not offer the primary motivation for managers to perform. Stajkovic and Luthans
(2001) suggest that feedback and social recognition may prove to be stronger motivators than
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money for managerial positions.
From an organizational perspective, the results offer insights as to the human resource
policies and practices that drive objective career success. Specifically, the findings of this study
present the human resource department with three questions: 1) Why are employees being
rewarded for the development of their human capital while their human capital is not reflected on
their performance evaluations? 2) Why are managers not being paid, in part, based on their
performance evaluations?
Research primarily in Western societies support the notion that hiring individuals with
greater levels of human capital results in greater on the job performance (Ng & Feldman, 2010).
Contrary to these findings, the results from the current study do not support this position. Based
on the results of the current study, it may be inferred that firms in Ecuador are hiring employees
based on their credentials and compensating them according to the symbolic value of those
credentials. In other words, while rewarding non-managerial employees based on their
performance evaluations is consistent with pay for performance practices, the non-significant
relationship between performance evaluations and pay for managers indicate that managers are
being rewarded solely based on their credentials and not for their performance. Rewarding
managers based on their formal education and not for their performance should draw attention
from human resource departments to find ways to link performance and pay at higher
organizational levels. From an economic perspective, the firm is paying for individuals with
higher degrees as well as for their specific training while not benefiting from enhanced
performance. This finding should encourage human resource departments to measure the specific
competencies their employees are acquiring from training, and how these competencies are being
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applied on the job.
The finding of a significant negative relationship between tenure and performance
evaluations should also be of concern to human resource directors. It would appear that once an
individual reaches a managerial position, based primarily on their formal education, they may
over time develop a sense of entitlement. This sense of entitlement, which is typical in high
power distance cultures may be influencing managers to lower their performance as the more
seniority they achieve.
Limitations
Research studies conducted based on data sources from a developing country often
encounter limitations of generalizability. This problem was encountered in this study because
only one pioneering Ecuadorian firm was using pay for performance across all of its employees
as a part of its HR pay policy. However, this limitation can be somewhat overcome because
Brutus, Gill and Duniewicz (2010) suggest that gaining a clear understanding of the context in
which a study takes place helps to generalize to other similar contexts. Specifically, the authors
stress the primacy of the generalizability of the independent variables over the generalizability of
the sample. This suggestion is applicable to this dissertation because a detailed understanding of
the different types of variables used offers the possibility of generalizing the results of the study
to other similar contexts.
In this study, some internal validity concerns may arise due to the operationalization of
the performance evaluation score. Two specific concerns are: 1) the assumption that supervisor
evaluation scores reflect actual productivity, and 2) by using secondary data provided by the
firm, the reliability of the performance evaluation score has not been tested. However, the use of
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supervisor evaluations as a proxy for performance, while controversial, has been widely used in
research and furthermore is necessary for research in industries where productivity is not readily
measurable due to its intangible nature of performance in service industries. While obtaining an
objective measure of productivity in a service industry may be elusive, the performance
evaluation score in the specific case of the firm used in this dissertation is the result of an
assessment by both supervisor and subordinate as to whether jointly established goals were
actually met. Therefore, the achievement of established goals should be mapped onto
performance evaluation scores and may be considered a measure of productivity.
While firm generated performance evaluation scores have not been tested for reliability,
these performance evaluation scores, and not performance evaluations with established
reliabilities, are the ones considered in the pay-for-performance HR policies established by the
organization. In other words, while from a research perspective measurement instruments are
expected to be validated, objective career success is based in part on non-validated performance
evaluation measures as the ones to be used in this dissertation. Therefore, testing the extension
on the human capital theory of career success with the performance evaluation scores as actually
used by the firm offers a more natural test of the proposed model.
An inherent limitation to this study is its cross-sectional design. Cross-sectional designs
do not allow for causal inferences therefore limiting the inferences from the study to conclusions
regarding the proposed relationships. While stronger causal inferences could be made using a
longitudinal design, the cross-sectional design used in this study offers a first step in testing the
proposed model. Furthermore, the results from this research may serve to better inform how
relationships interact as well as their boundary conditions before developing a more dynamic
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model and hypothesizing how changes in human capital may influence changes in performance
evaluations and consequently changes in career success.
Future Research Directions
The extension of the human capital theory of career success, as proposed in this
dissertation, lends itself for future testing using a longitudinal design in order to dynamically test
the relationships proposed in this dissertation. Specifically, researchers may investigate how
changes in human capital influence changes in performance evaluation scores and consequently
changes in objective career success. A longitudinal design can overcome some of the imitations
of cross-sectional designs by dynamically testing theory (Pitariu & Ployhart, 2010; Ployhart &
Vandenberg, 2010).
Another avenue for future research is to gain a better understanding of how different
competencies are developed by the alternative forms of human capital and how those
competencies become mapped on performance evaluation scores and consequently objective
career success. For example, political skill may be developed through formal education, training,
and/or tenure and consequently influence performance evaluations as well as compensation.
Finally, prior research indicated that the antecedents for objective career success are
different than those for subjective career success (Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005). Future
career research can focus on explaining how human capital development and performance
valuations influence not only objective career success, but also subjective career success.
Conclusion
This dissertation extends human capital theory beyond the traditional economic rational
perspective to include the influence of managerial policies and practices as well as the influence
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of socio-cultural and institutional pressures. Specifically, this dissertation explains how
human capital influences objective career success of managers and non-managers in a sociallyrich environment such as Ecuador, a Latin American region relatively neglected in the current
literature. This contribution resonates well with the argument of Thomas and Inkson, and Ituma
and Simpson that “in order to better understand individual‟s career needs, we must progress
beyond the individualistic and de-contextualized models offered by the majority of studies and
develop a more complex interpretation, which acknowledges the interplay between individual
careers and the wider institutional and national cultures” (Ituma & Simpson, 2006, p. 992).
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Obtained Series 7 and 63 licenses. Portfolio management.

CERTIFICATES




Babson Symposium for Entrepreneurship Educators Argentina, 2007
Entrepreneurial Leadership Training-of-Trainers Certificate, Babson College October,
2006
Project Management Professional (PMP), October 2005

PROFESSIONAL SEMINARS ATTENDED







Testing Interactions with Linear Regression, Center for Advancement of Research
Methods and Analysis (CARMA), Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009
Meta Analysis: Models and Processes, Center for Advancement of Research Methods and
Analysis (CARMA), Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009
Project Management, CFC, Quito, Ecuador 2005
Project Management, CFC, Quito, Ecuador 2004
Financial Statement Analysis, CEFE, Quito, Ecuador 1994
Budgeting, CEFE, Quito, Ecuador 1994
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Marketing, CEFE, Quito, Ecuador 1994
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